Einführung/Hilfe
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Titel: |
Jason Baehr: Knowledge and Intellectual Virtue |
Beginn: |
31.05.2023 18:15 |
Karte: |
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Beschreibung: |
In its earliest formulations, contemporary virtue epistemology was comprised of two camps both of which were committed to offering a virtue-based account of knowledge. “Virtue responsibilists” like Zagzebski (1996) sought to define knowledge as (roughly) true belief arising the motives and actions characteristic of virtues like intellectual carefulness, thoroughness, and open-mindedness. “Virtue reliabilists” like Ernest Sosa (1993) sought to define knowledge as (roughly) true belief produced by reliable cognitive faculties or abilities like memory, introspection, and vision. Since those early years, the landscape of virtue epistemology has changed considerably. While Zagzebski and followers continue to ground knowledge in something approximating an exercise of intellectual character virtues, Sosa (2017) has proposed a theory of “reflective knowledge” that blurs the line between “character virtues” and “faculty virtues” and thus between virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. In this talk, I’ll undertake a critical examination of Zagzebski’s and Sosa’s theories of knowledge. I’ll argue that Sosa’s recent account of reflective knowledge is more promising than a purely responsibilist account, but that it may, in the end, be susceptible to a charge of theoretical artificiality.
Ort: noch nicht festgelegt |
Veranstaltungsort: |
Adresse: |
Universität Bielefeld U2-200 33501 Bielefeld |
Veranstalter: |
Adresse: |
Universität Bielefeld, Abteilung Philosophie |
Telefon: |
0521-106-3068 |
E-Mail: |
buelter.phil@uni-bielefeld.de |
Homepage: |
http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/philosophie/lehramt/fachtage.html |
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