Titel:	The Objective Reality of Causality
Beginn:	17.05.2012 00:00
Karte:	Bei Google Maps anzeigen
Beschreibung:	Description Even though the question as to what kind of objective reality causation has does not normally take center stage in current philosophical theorizing about causation, it is of core relevance for a thorough understanding of causal relationships and the role they play in science. Three main positions concerning the objective reality of causation can be distinguished. First, in the vein of standard interpretations of Hume, one may deny that causality is a mind-independent feature of reality (e.g. Putnam 1983). Somewhat more moderately, one might apply constructive empiricism to causal claims and grant empirical adequacy, but no deeper reality to the causal claims of scientific theories (e.g. van Fraassen 1980). Second, one may follow the majority of theories of causation by subscribing to what Costa (1989) has labelled causal objectivism, according to which "causes are objective in the sense that causal relations will continue to hold among events in the world even if there were no minds to perceive them". Third, there are a number of interesting intermediate positions: epistemic causality, which Williamson (2005) objectivizes via his objective Bayesianism, projectivism, which derives from Kant and versions of which are nowadays advanced by Blackburn (1993), Spohn (1993, 2010), or Ward (2002, 2005), or structural realism, according to which we can only come to know what scientific theories tell us about the structures or relations between entities in the world but not about the nature of those entities (e.g., Worrall 1989, Ladyman 1998, Psillos 1999, 2001, Esfeld 2009). This workshop brings together some of the leading authors that have shaped the recent debates on the objective reality of causation. It provides a forum for discussion and exchange of the newest results and ideas. Speakers/Titles Michael Esfeld (Lausanne): Causal Properties in Physics Mathias Frisch (Maryland): No Place for Causes? Causal Skepticism in Physics Stephen Mumford (Nottingham): TBA David Papineau (King's College): Understanding Intervention Markus Schrenk (Köln): Causal Determination and the Constraints of Agency Michael Tooley (Colorado): Causation and Probability Jon Williamson (Kent): Causality as Objective but not Real Lorenzo Casini (Konstanz): Causality: Genuine Reference, Derivative Realities and Other Tales Luke Glynn (CalTech): Causation is Objective, but Relative Eric Raidl (Paris): Ontic vs. Epistemic Objectivity of Causation Michael Baumgartner (Konstanz): Objectifying Causal Regularities Wolfgang Spohn (Konstanz): Causation can be Understood as Objective (only) via an Objectivization of a Subjective Notion of Causation Participants are very welcome. There are no fees, but we would like to ask participants to register by sending an email to Michael Baumgartner.
Veranstaltungsort:
Adresse:	Universität Koblenz, Room V1001 (Senatssaal) Universitätsstraße 10 78464 Konstanz
Veranstalter:
Adresse:	Universität Konstanz Michael Baumgarten
Telefon:	[+49] (0)7531 88-2745
E-Mail:	michael.baumgartner@uni-konstanz.de
Homepage:	http://www.uni-konstanz.de